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Abstract
In this paper, we propose new sequential methods for detecting port-scan attackers which
routinely perform random “portscans” of IP addresses to find vulnerable servers to compro-
mise. In addition to rigorously control the probability of falsely implicating benign remote
hosts as malicious, our method performs significantly faster than other current solutions. More-
over, our method guarantees that the maximum amount of observational time is bounded. In
contrast to the previous most effective method, Threshold Random Walk Algorithm, which is
explicit and analytical in nature, our proposed algorithm involve parameters to be determined
by numerical methods. We have developed computational techniques such as iterative mini-
max optimization for quick determination of the parameters of the new detection algorithm.
A framework of multi-valued decision for testing portscanners is also proposed.
1 Introduction
As Internet becomes pervasive to our society, it is increasingly important to develop high perfor-
mance network intrusion detection system (NIDS) to identify an attacker to allow for protective
response to mitigate or fully prevent damage. An important need in such NIDS is prompt re-
sponse: the sooner a NIDS detects malice, the lower the resulting damage. At the same time, a
NIDS should not falsely implicate benign remote hosts as malicious [3, 4, 6]. There are many types
of network intrusions. An extremely dangerous one is the “portscans” intrusion. A port-scan is
an attack that sends client requests to a range of server port addresses on a host, with the goal
of finding an active port and exploiting a known vulnerability of that service [7, 9, 10].
In recent years, some detection schemes have been developed by virtue of statistical hypothesis
testing. For example, the problem of detecting port-scan attacks has been addressed in the
framework of testing a binomial parameter. In this direction, adaptive methods such as the
Sequential Probability Ratio Tests [11] have been explored for fast detection of port-scan attacks.
However, these techniques generally suffers from two drawbacks. First, the maximum number
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of required observations is not deterministically bounded. Hence, there is a probability that the
detection time is extremely long. Second, the existing detection algorithms usually attempt to
be optimal for only a few parametric values and consequently the average performance for other
parametric values many be very poor. In order to overcome these limitations, we propose a new
methods for fast detection of port-scan attacks in the general framework of multistage tests of
hypotheses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider the problem of
testing port-scan attack. In particular, we discuss the widely accepted binomial model and the
threshold random walk detection algorithm. In Section 3, we introduce new sequential algorithm
for detecting port-scan attacks. In Section 4, a framework of multi-valued decision for testing
portscanners is proposed. Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 Binomial Model
A major characteristics of scanners is that they have higher chance than legitimate remote hosts
to choose hosts which do not exist or do not have the requested service activated, since they lack
precise knowledge of which hosts and ports on the target network are currently active [4, 6, 10].
Based on this observation, a detection problem has been formulated to provide the basis for an
on-line algorithm whose goal is to reduce the number of observed connection attempts (compared
to previous approaches) to flag malicious activity, while bounding the probabilities of missed
detection and false detection. In this direction, a widely accepted model is the binomial model
[4, 9] described in the sequel.
We shall adopt the description of [4] for the binomial model used for the detection of port-scan
attacks. The activity that a remote source r makes a connection attempt to a local destination
l can be considered as a random event. A frequent method to model such event is to classify
the outcome of the attempt as either a “success” or a “failure”, where the latter corresponds to
a connection attempt to an inactive host or to an inactive service on an otherwise active host.
More formally, for a given r, let Xi be a random variable that represents the outcome of the first
connection attempt by r to the i-th distinct local host, where
Xi =

1 if the connection attempt is a success,0 if the connection attempt is a failure (1)
As illustrated in [4, 5], it is reasonable to assume that Xi, i = 1, 2, · · · are independent and
identically Bernoulli random variables such that
Pr{Xi = 1} = 1− Pr{Xi = 0} = p,
where p ∈ (0, 1) is the success rate of making a connection. Usually, the success rate p is unknown
and varying for different types of users. However, the success rate p of a scanner is normally very
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low, while the success rate p of a benign user is high. By appropriate choosing values of threshold
values p0 and p1 such that 0 < p0 < p1 < 1 based on empirical data analysis of relevant networks,
the hypothesis that “the host is a scanner” can be formulated as H0 : p ≤ p0. Similarly, the
hypothesis that “the host is a benign user” can be formulated as H1 : p ≥ p1. This amounts to
the problem of testing statistical hypotheses
H0 : p ≤ p0 versus H1 : p ≥ p1
based on Xi, i = 1, 2, · · · . Throughout the remainder of this paper, let Pr{E | p} denote the
probability of event E associated with p. To control the probabilities of making wrong decisions,
it is typically required that
Pr{Reject H0 | p} ≤ α for all p ∈ (0, p0], Pr{Reject H1 | p} ≤ β for all p ∈ [p1, 1) (2)
where α, β ∈ (0, 1) are some pre-specified numbers. In order to minimize the potential damage of
network intrusion and control the probability of false alarm, it is desirable to make this detection
as quickly as possible, but with a high probability of being correct. The above formulation of the
port-scanner detection problem has been proposed by a number of researchers and many detection
algorithms have been developed. One of the most effective algorithms for early scan detection is
the Threshold Random Walk Algorithm (TRWA) developed in [4, 5], which is represented in the
following section.
3 Threshold Random Walk Algorithm
The widely cited Threshold Random Walk Algorithm [4] is derived from the famous Sequential
Probability Ratio Test (SPRTs) invented by Abraham Wald [11] in the War time in response to
the demand of efficient testing of ammunition power. Define relative frequency p̂n =
∑
n
i=1
Xi
n
for
n = 1, 2, · · · . The idea of TRWA is to continuously observe the probability ratio
Pr{X1, · · · , Xn | p0}
Pr{X1, · · · , Xn | p1}
= exp
(
n
[
p̂n ln
p0
p1
+ (1− p̂n) ln
1− p0
1− p1
])
for n = 1, 2, · · · . The observational process is continued until Pr{X1,··· ,Xn|p0}Pr{X1,··· ,Xn|p1} ≤ k0 or
Pr{X1,··· ,Xn|p0}
Pr{X1,··· ,Xn|p1}
≥
k1 for some positive integer n, where k0 < k1 are two pre-specified positive integers for controlling
the probability of making wrong decisions. At the termination of the observational process, a
decision is made as follows:
If Pr{X1,··· ,Xn|p0}Pr{X1,··· ,Xn|p1} ≤ k0, then declare the source r as a benign user. If
Pr{X1,··· ,Xn|p0}
Pr{X1,··· ,Xn|p1}
≥ k1, then
declare the source r as a scanner.
It can be shown that TRWA has the following properties: If 0 < k0 = α < 1 <
1
β
= k1, then
the TRWA ensures the risk requirement (2). Moreover, the average number of observations is
minimized for both p0 and p1 among all possible tests such that Pr{Reject H0 | p0} ≤ α and
Pr{Reject H1 | p1} ≤ β.
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Despite its remarkable simplicity and optimality for threshold values, the TRWA has the fol-
lowing major drawbacks. First, the number of observations is not bounded by a deterministic
number. In the extreme case, the detection time can be unacceptably long. Second, as a conse-
quence of the fact that TRWA is optimal when the true success rate p assumes value p0 or p1, the
average performance can be very poor when the true rate of success differs from p0 and p1. Since
the choice of threshold values p0 and p1 is based on empirical data analysis and is thus some what
arbitrary, the performance of the detection algorithm is important for p taking values different
from p0 and p1. To overcome these drawbacks, we propose to develop a detection method in the
next section.
4 New Detection Algorithm
Our new detection algorithm depends on 3 positive parameters a, b and ζ, which are to be deter-
mined by a computational method to guarantee the risk requirement. The parameter ζ is called
the risk tuning parameter. The parameters a and b are referred to as weighting coefficients. Let
the relative frequency p̂n be defined as before. For the ease of describing our detection algorithm,
define new random variables
Yn =


ln 1
1−p0
for p̂n = 0,
p̂n ln
p̂n
p0
+ (1− p̂n) ln
1−p̂n
1−p0
for 0 < p̂n < 1,
ln 1
p0
for p̂n = 1
Zn =


ln 1
1−p1
for p̂n = 0,
p̂n ln
p̂n
p1
+ (1− p̂n) ln
1−p̂n
1−p1
for 0 < p̂n < 1,
ln 1
p1
for p̂n = 1
for n = 1, 2, · · · . We are now in a position to state the stopping and decision rules of our detection
algorithm in the sequel.
4.1 Stopping and Decision Rules
Assume that the risk tuning parameter and weighting coefficients can be determined to satisfy
the risk requirement (2), our detection algorithm can be described as follow.
Continue taking observations until Yn ≥
1
n
ln 1
ζa
, p̂n ≥ p0 or Zn ≥
1
n
ln 1
ζb
, p̂n ≤ p1 for some
positive integer n. At the termination of observational process, make the following decision: If
Zn ≥
1
n
ln 1
ζb
, p̂n ≤ p1, then declare the source r as a scanner. If Yn ≥
1
n
ln 1
ζa
, p̂n ≥ p0, then declare
the source r as a benign user.
For p0 = 0.2, p1 = 0.8, our stopping and decision rules with ζ = 1 and a = b = 0.1 can be
shown by Figure 1. The lower shaded area represents the acceptance region of H0. The upper
shaded area represents the rejection region of H0. The blue line with star symbols represents
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a sample path. The observational process is continued until the sample path hit either the
acceptance region of rejection region of H0. If the sample path hits the acceptance region of H0,
then declare that r is a scanner. If the sample path hits the rejection region of H0, then declare
that r is a benign user.
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Figure 1: An illustration of new detection algorithm
4.2 Determination of Risk Tuning Parameter and Weighting Coefficients
Given that our detection algorithm can be parameterized as in Section 4.1, we need to determine
the risk tuning parameter ζ and weighting coefficients a, b so that the required number of obser-
vations is as small as possible, while guaranteeing the risk requirement (2). The computational
process for accomplishing this task is called risk tuning. Clearly, the risk requirement is satisfied if
ζ is sufficiently small. This implies that if the weighting coefficients are given, one can determine
the risk tuning parameter ζ to meet the risk requirement by the following two steps: First, find
the maximum number, ζ, in the set {2−i : i ∈ N}, where N is the set of natural numbers, such that
the risk requirement is satisfied when the risk tuning parameter ζ assumes value ζ. Second, apply
a bisection search method to obtain a number ζ⋆ as large as possible from interval [ζ, 2ζ) such
that the risk requirement is satisfied when the risk tuning parameter ζ assumes value ζ⋆. How-
ever, these two steps are not sufficient to produces detection algorithm of satisfactory efficiency
if the weighting coefficients are not properly chosen. To overcome this limitation, we observe
that to make a detection algorithm efficient, it is an effective approach to make the detection
algorithm efficient when the success rate p assumes values p0 and p1. This is a consequence of
the fact that Pr{Accept H0 | p} is non-increasing with respect to p ∈ (0, 1). Due to the mono-
tonicity of the operating characteristic function, it suffices to ensure Pr{Reject H0 | p0} ≤ α and
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Pr{Reject H1 | p1} ≤ β to satisfy the risk requirement (2). Define
A =
α
Pr{Reject H0 | p0}
, B =
β
Pr{Reject H1 | p1}
Q = max {A, B} , R = min {A, B}
as functions of a, b and ζ. For purpose of developing an efficient detection algorithm satisfying
the risk requirement, we propose to determine risk tuning parameter ζ and weighting coefficients
a, b such that Q is minimized under the constraint that R is no less than 1. This task can be
accomplished by applying the iterative minimax optimization algorithm described as follows.
∇ Set the maximum number of iterations as kmax. Choose the initial values of
weighting coefficients as a = α and b = β. Let Q̂←∞ and k ← 0.
∇While k ≤ kmax, do the following:
⋄ Use a bisection search method to determine a number ζ∗ > 0 as large as
possible for ζ such that the value of R associated with a, b and ζ∗ is no
less than 1. Let A∗, B∗ and Q∗ respectively denote the corresponding
values of A, B and Q.
⋄ If Q∗ < Q̂, then let â← ζ∗a, b̂← ζ∗b and Q̂← Q∗. If A∗ = Q∗, then let
a← ζ∗a(1 + Q
∗
−1
5
). If B∗ = Q∗, then let b← ζ∗b(1 + Q
∗
−1
5
). Let k ← k + 1.
∇ Return ζ = 1 as the desired risk tuning parameter and â, b̂ as
the weighting coefficients.
The intuition behind this algorithm is that Pr{Reject H0 | p0} and Pr{Reject H1 | p1} are
“roughly” increasing with respect to a and b, respectively, when the risk tuning parameter ζ is
fixed.
In the execution of the algorithm, we need to compute the probabilistic terms like Pr{Reject H0 |
p0} and Pr{Reject H1 | p1}. These quantities can be computed by the path counting method of
[2] or the recursive algorithm of [8].
4.3 Maximum Number of Observations
One salient feature of the above algorithm is that the maximum number of observations is ab-
solutely bounded. Moreover, the maximum number is the least integer no less than m which
satisfies the following equations: (
1− p0
1− z
)1−z (p0
z
)z
= (ζa)
1
m ,(
1− p1
1− z
)1−z (p1
z
)z
= (ζb)
1
m ,
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where z ∈ (p0, p1). To solve the above equations for m, we first eliminate m and obtain
ln
[(
1−p0
1−z
)1−z (
p0
z
)z]
ln
[(
1−p1
1−z
)
1−z (
p1
z
)z] = ln(ζa)ln(ζb) ,
from which we find the root z = z∗ by a bisection search method. Afterward, we substitute
z = z∗ into the first equation to obtain the corresponding m = m∗. Then, the maximum number
of observations is equal to ⌊m∗⌋+1. It should be noted that, in the special case of a = b, we have
(1 − z) ln
1− p0
1− p1
+ z ln
p0
p1
= 0,
from which we obtain
z∗ =
ln 1−p01−p1
ln (1−p0)p1(1−p1)p0
and a closed-formed formula for m∗.
4.4 Comparison with TRWA
We have conducted numerical experiments for comparing our detection scheme with TRWA. For
the case of p0 = 0.1, p1 = 0.15 and α = β = 0.1, the risks of our detection scheme (with
ζ = 0.96, a = b = 0.1) and TRWA are respectively shown by the blue and green plots in Figure
2. With the same configuration, the ratio between the average number of observations of our
detection algorithm to that of TRWA is shown in Figure 3. Our computation shows that the new
detection algorithm requires a much smaller number of connection attempts to detect a scanner
as compared to TRWA.
5 Multi-Valued Decision
As can be seen from the risk requirement (2), there is no specification imposed for users with
success rate p ∈ (p0, p1). This implies that those users can be arbitrarily classified as either
scanners or benign users. In applications, p0 is usually chosen as a number close to 0, while p1
is chosen as a number close to 1. Therefore, there exists a wide gap between p0 and p1. This
indicates that there is a large portion of “marginal” users being cast into either the category
of scanners or benign users. In view of this situation, we propose to classify the users as three
categories: scanner, marginal, and benign. Specifically, let p0 and p1 be two threshold values such
that 0 < p0 < p1 < 1. We propose to test the following three hypotheses:
H0 : p ≤ p0, H1 : p0 < p < p1, H2 : p ≥ p1
where hypotheses H0, H1 and H2 corresponds to the categories of “scanner”, “marginal”, and
“benign”. Based on the classification, different actions are taken for the corresponding categories.
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Figure 2: Comparison of risks
To control the probabilities of making wrong decisions, we impose the following requirement:
Pr{Reject H0 | p} ≤ δ0 for p ∈ (0, p
′
0
],
Pr{Reject H1 | p} ≤ δ1 for p ∈ [p
′′
0
, p′
1
],
Pr{Reject H2 | p} ≤ δ2 for p ∈ [p
′′
1 , 1)
where 0 < p′
0
< p0 < p
′′
0
< p′
1
< p1 < p
′′
1
< 1 and δi ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, 2, 3. The intervals (p
′
0
, p′′
0
)
and (p′
1
, p′′
1
) are called indifference zones, since no specification is imposed for controlling the
probability of making wrong decisions for p contained in these intervals. This problem is actually
a special case of the general problem of testing multiple hypotheses, which has been systematically
addressed in our recent paper [1]. The techniques in [1] offer a complete solution to the present
problem of testing triple hypotheses on the success rate p. As an illustration, assume that
δ0 = δ1 = δ2 = 0.1,
p0 =
1
3
, p1 =
2
3
,
and
p′
0
= p0 −
1
9
, p′′
0
= p0 +
1
9
, p′
1
= p1 −
1
9
, p′′
1
= p1 +
1
9
.
By virtue of the technique of [1], we have obtained a sequential testing scheme shown by Figure
4, where the bottom, middle and upper shaded areas represent the acceptance regions of H0,H1
and H2, respectively. The stopping and decision rules can be stated as follows:
If the sample path, which can be represented by the plot of the relative frequency p̂n versus
the number n of observations, hits a shaded region, then terminate the observational process. At
8
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Figure 3: Comparison of average number of observations
the termination of the observational process, accept the hypothesis of which the acceptance region
is hit by the sample path.
In Figure 5, we plot the risk, Pr{The decision is incorrect | p}, versus the success rate p. It
can be seen that the risk requirement is satisfied for any p ∈ (0, 1) not contained in the indifference
zones.
6 Conclusion
We have developed new sequential methods for detecting portscanners. In addition to guaran-
teeing the risk requirement, our algorithm is efficient when the success rate assumes values other
than the threshold values. Moreover, the required number of observations is absolutely bounded.
Furthermore, we have proposed a framework of multi-valued decision for testing portscanners.
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